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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Pla intiff/Respondent,
vs.

]

Case No. 87-0406-CA

DONALD CARLTON SHAMBLIN,
Defendant/Appellant.

]

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW:
I.

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this
matter pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, Section 78-2a-3(2)(c) (Repl
Vol. 9, 1987 ed.) and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals.
II.

NATURE AND PROCEEDINGS

This Section is adopted from Appellant's Brief.
III.
1.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether or not an inventory of a vehicle, impounded

as required under Section 41-6-44.30, UCA 1953, as Amended
following an arrest for a violation of Section 41-6-44, UCA
1953, as Amended, and conducted pursuant to standard
departmental policy with the contents of the vehicle listed on a
standard inventory form as provided by the Utah Highway Patrol
is per se unreasonable and violative of the owners
constitutional rights simply because the policy of the Utah

Highway Patrol did not mandate the opening of closed containers.
2.

Whether or not the absence of an offer to allow the

owner an opportunity to secure the contents of the vehicle
before the inventory and impoundment/ even though the owner
never requested that right/ was per se unreasonable so as to
require the suppression of any evidence found.
3.

Whether or not admissions of the Appellant

concerning specific amounts of alcohol consumed made to the
officer after a waiver of the Miranda Rights were admissable.
4.

Whether or not a witness admitted as an expert to

testify on the identification and analysis of marijuana and who
testified to having worked as a narcotics officer for several
years was competent to testify concerning the odor of burnt
marijuana.
5.

Whether or not the Trial Court's instructions to

the Jury regarding the term "reasonable doubt" denied Appellant
a fair trial.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE

Fourth Amendment/ United States Constitution
Fifth Amendment/ United States Constitution
Fourteenth Amendment/ United State Constitution
Article 1/ Section 7,

Utah State Constitution

Article 1/ Section 14/ Utah State Constitution
U.C.A. Section 76-1-501(1)
U.C.A. Section 41-6-44
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U.C.A. Section 41-6-44.30
V

*

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This Section is adopted from Appellant's Brief.
VI.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The inventory of the vehicle conducted after a valid
arrest for a violation of Section 41-6-44/ UCA 1953/ as amended/
was conducted as required in Section 41-6-44.30/ UCA 1953/ as
amended/ and General Order No. 83-10 of the Utah Highway
Patrol/ a copy of which is attached hereto and marked Exhibit
"A".

There are no indications of any violations of Highway

Patrol Policy or of any excessive scope of the search.

There

are no allegations of bad faith on the part of the Trooper nor
of any suspicion of contraband that could lend creedence to
calling this inventory a pretextual search.

The mere lack of a

specific directive mandating opening of all closed containers
does not require the search be found to be unreasonable per se/
but should be one factor to be considered in determining the
overall reasonableness of the inventory procedure.
The police officer should not be required to ask a
driver of a vehicle if there are any items the driver wishes to
secure before an inventory is conducted.

The U.S. Supreme Court

has expressly stated that such is not required under the
Constitution.
The jury was entitled to all relevant facts concerning
the issue of level of intoxication or ability to safely operate
a motor vehicle and the admission of the Appellant concerning
amount of alcohol consumed.

Since it is only illegal to drink
-3-

and drive after a sufficient quantity of alcohol is consumed so
as to bring the blood/alcohol level to .08% or to render the
driver incapable of safely operating the vehicle/ the jury was
entitled to know the amount of alcohol admittedly consumed by
the Defendant and to draw their own conclusions therefrom.
fEvidence

adverse to the Appellant is not necessarily prejudicial

and the Defendant was free to call his own expert if he wished
to try to mitigate the impact.
The expert witness called to testify concerning the
analysis and identification of marijuana was competent to
testify concerning all aspects of marijuana with which he was
familiar.

The testimony relating to odor of burnt marijuana is

non-scientific in nature, requiring no special expertise other
than prior experience with marijuna and should be admissable on
the same basis as lay testimony on the odor of alcohol or level
of intoxication.
The Trial Court's instruction on reasonable doubt was
adequate to safeguard the Appellant's Constitutional Rights and
the Respondent submits that issue on the basis of the Amicus
Curiae Brief submitted by the Honorable Robert F. Owens.
VII.

ARGUMENTS

A. THE SEARCH OF THE CLOSED CONTAINERS PURSUANT TO A
VALID INVENTORY PROCEDURE WAS REASONABLE AND CONDUCTED
ACCORDING TO LAW AND UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL GUIDELINES.
Appellant has made no claim that the initial stop of
this vehicle and his subsequent arrest for DUI under Section
41-6-44, UCA 1953, as amended, were defective in any way.
Subsequent to the arrest, Trooper Lloyd was required by Section
-4-

41-6-44.30/ UCA 1953/ as amended/ to impound the vehicle unless
the conditions enumerated in subsection (2) of that statute
apply.

In this case since no one but the Appellant was present

in the vehicle Trooper Lloyd had no choice but to impound the
vehicle.

Prior to the impound/ Trooper Lloyd filled out a

standard Utah Highway Patrol Vehicle Inventory Form/ a copy of
which is attached hereto and marked Exhibit "B".
factually indistinguishable from

The case is

Colorado v. Bertine/ 93 L.

Ed. 2d. 739/ with the one exception being that in Bertine there
was a specific policy to open and inspect closed containers
while the Utah Highway Patrol had none.

It should be noted/

however, that the standard inventory form provides spaces for an
inventory of both the glove box and trunk/ areas which are
normally closed and even locked.

By implication the Utah

Highway Patrol has therefore authorized search of closed
containers.

Regulations spelling out each type of container

that could be searched would be unduly cumbersome and should not
be constitutionally required.

Instead/ all factors should be

considered in the light of reasonableness to determine if any
overreaching occurred.
In this case,

there are no indications Trooper Lloyd

was doing anything other than carrying out his caretaker
functions as specifically authorized under South Dakota v.
Opperman 428 U.S. 364, 49 L. Ed. 2d. 1000/ 96 S. Ct. 3092
(1976)/ and State v. Johnson 60 Utah Advance Reports 30 (Utah
June 30/ 1987).

There was no indication of any suspicion of the
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presence of contraband or illegal activity such as was present
in State v. Hygh 711 P.2d, 264, 265, (Utah, 1985), which might
have indicated a pretextual search for evidence.

The bag in

which the contraband was found was not locked but only zipped
shut and was found not in some secret or locked compartment/ but
instead in the sleeper unit located immediately to the rear of
the driver's seat and open thereto.

The inventory form was

filled out in extensive detail to the extent of listing a "roll
of t.p./" "pillow," "water jug/" and "brown case with 39 tapes"
to name only a few.

The fact that each item of clothing in the

suitcase or each tool in the toolbox is not listed separately
cannot be used to imply the inventory was merely a pretextual
search in view of the detail that is present.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Johnson quoted with approval
the doctrine of United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798/ 821
(1982).
"When a legitimate search is under way/ and when its
purpose and its limits have been precisely defined,
nice distinctions between.... glove compartments/
upholstered seats,
trunks/ and wrapped packages... must
give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient
completion of the task at hand."
In Johnson, the Utah Supreme Court expressly sanctioned
an inventory search by the Los Angeles police of the trunk/
under the hood/ inside an unlocked jewelry box/ and in
unwrapping a towel/ since there was no showing of bad faith on
the part of the officers.

There is no showing in the instant

case of bad faith on the part of Trooper Lloyd and it would be
highly anomalous to prohibit the Utah Highway Patrol from
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performing the same activities expressly sanctioned by the Los
Angeles Police.

See also State v. Ailport,

413 N.W. 2d. 140

(1987) and State v. Criscola/ 444 P.2d. 517 (Utah 1968).
B. THE OFFICER WAS NOT REQUIRED TO GIVE THE APPELLANT
AN OPPORTUNITY TO SECURE HIS PROPERTY BEFORE THE INVENTORY AND
IMPOUND.
While it is true that Trooper Lloyd could have given
the Appellant an opportunity to secure his possessions before
the inventory and impound/ there is no Constitutional
requirement to do so.

This same argument was made in Bertine

and specifically rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court.
earlier decision in Lafayettef

Quoting an

the Court stated:

"The real reason is not what could have been achieved/
but whether the Fourth Amendment requires such
steps... the reasonableness of any particular
governmental activity does not necessarily or
invariably turn on the existence of alternative less
intrusive means." Bertine 93 L. Ed. 2d. 739 at 747.
(Other citations omi tted).
In addition/ there were specific reasons for not
allowing the Appellant to secure his possessions.

Since the

Appellant was under the influence of alcohol at the time/
allowing him the climb back into the tractor could have
endangered himself and engendered liability on the part of the
Trooper who was by then aware of the Appellant's condition.
Appellant1s claim while under the influence of alcohol that he
had nothing of value may not have protected the Trooper from
future claims of lost or stolen property/ which the use of the
inventory could help prevent.

Allowing any individual access to

a closed bag could certainly endanger an officer who would have
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no way of knowing whether or not a weapon was present.

Also,

valuables are often located inside small closed packages which
made it only reasonable for the Trooper to inspect all items not
securely locked.

Finally/ Appellant offers no means by which he

could have secured the packages in which the contraband was
found/ since he was under arrest and certainly could not have
taken the items into the jail.

Appellant never asked for the

right or privilege of securing his property and the Trooper
should not be faulted for not providing the opportunity.
C. ADMISSION OF APPELLANT'S STATEMENTS CONCERNING
AMOUNT OF ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION WAS NOT ERROR.
Appellant's admission of having consumed "a six pack of
beer" were admittedly relevant to issues at trial.

Appellant

claims only that the amount was unfairly prejudicial without any
expert corroboration as the the meaning of consuming that
amount.

The State should not be required to produce expert

testimony based on the statements of the Appellant and possibly
hinder its own case.

The admitted consumption of alcohol by the

Appellant would net have produced the level of intoxication
shown by the intoxilyzer and may have cast doubt on the results
of the intoxilyzer.

Appellant was free to call his own witness

to that end had he desired but he chose not to do so.

The Jury

sits as the determiner of fact and since it is not against the
law to drink and drive/ they were entitled to know the admitted
amount of consumption so that they could draw their own
conclusions.

The State's case depended on the Jury finding a

level of .08% or greater of alcohol in the blood or an inability
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of Appellant to safely operate the vehicle.

The State was

entitled to present all relevant evidence, with or without
expert corroboration, and let the Jury make their decision from
that evidence.

Appellant cannot claim prejudice simply because

the evidence was adverse to his position.

He must instead

articulate a specific unfair prejudice that sufficiently
outweighs the probative value to the extent that it should be
excluded under Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

No

compelling reasons have been advanced.
D. TESTIMONY BY AN EXPERT CONCERNING THE ODOR OF
BURNT MARIJUANA WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL.
Detective Dennis Rogers of the St. George Police
Department was called by the State to give expert testimony on
the analysis and identification of marijuana.

Detective

Rogers1 qualifications included having worked as a narcotics
officer for several years and he testified concerning his
familiarity with the odor of burnt marijuana.

After testifying

of his analysis of the marijuana found in Appellant's
possession, Detective Rogers testified as to the odor of burnt
marijuana emanating from the pipe and bong which were also found
in Appellant's possession.

This testimony was relevant to show

Appellant's intent to possess and/or use the marijuana.

Since

the odor is a subjective opinion, based on a non-scientific
test, it does not fall within the Frye test for admissability,
and instead is more closely likened to lay opinion on the odor
of alcohol, for example which is commonly accepted.

Since

Detective Rogers had worked around marijuana for several years,
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he would have certainly been familiar with its odor and he so
testified*

No more foundation should have been required and

Appellant certainly had the opportunity to attack the weight-or
credibility of such evidence.
E. THE INSTRUCTION ON "REASONABLE DOUBT" AS GIVEN BY
THE TRIAL COURT ADEQUATELY PROTECTED THE APPELLANT'S RIGHTS.
Although the "reasonable doubt" instruction offered by
the Appellant has been approved by the Utah Supreme Court and
the instruction as given in this case has not been specifically
approved/ absent some showing the Jury was misled into accepting
a lower standard to convict the verdict should stand.

Since

this issue has been briefed in an Amicus Curiae Brief by the
Honorable Robert F. Owens, the Respondent concurs in the same
and submits this issue on that basis.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

On either Federal or State Constitutional Grounds/ the
inventory of the vehicle as expressly allowed under both State
and Federal Law was conducted reasonably and in accordance with
the principles enunciated.

The Trooper followed standardized

procedures on a standarized form and there is no showing by
evidence or implication that this inventory as conducted was a
pretext for anything other than what it actually was/ a simple
inventory prior to impound.

The lack of a specific articulated

policy concerning the search of closed containers should not
invalidate the procedure per se but should only subject it to
the test of reasonableness.

Even if the Utah Highway Patrol

Policy specifically required the search of closed containers it
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would still be subject to the same test of reasonableness.

The

evidence regarding possession of the marijuana/ including the
odor thereof/ was properly admitted and the decision of the Jury
should be affirmed.
The testimony concerning consumption of alcohol was
highly probative to the issue of DUI and was also properly
admitted under the Utah Rules of Evidence.

The Jury Instruction

on reasonable doubt/ adequately safeguarded Appellant's
Constitutional Rights and the Jury Verdict/ properly arrived at/
should be affirmed on both counts.
Respectfully submitted this /I/

'

day of March/ 1988.

k BfrESTT LANGSTON /
DEPUTY WASHINGTON C0UNTY ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that on this

JK

-^

day of March/

1988/ I mailed a copy of the above and foregoing Brief of
Respondent/ to G. Michael Westfall/ Gallian and Westfall/ Dixie
State Bank Building/ One South Main Street/ P. 0. Box 367/ St.
George, Utah 84770,

-ZWW)
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GENERAL ORDER NO, 83-10
(Revised January, 1986)
TO:

All Personnel

SUBJECT
Handling abandoned, stolen, improperly registered
vehicles or vehicles in hazardous condition and custodial
care of such vehicles.
PURPOSE

1.

To establish-procedures to be used when discovering
abandoned, stolen, improperly registered vehicles in
hazardous condition and the proper c-are of such
vehicles.

AUTHORITY

1.

Under the existing Utah statutes peace officers are
authorized to remove and/or cause to be removed
vehicles under the following conditions:
a.

When any vehicle is parked, stopped or standing
on a roadway, whether attended or unattended,where it was practical to stop off the roadway
(U.C.A. 41-6-101).
When any vehicle is illegally left standing on
any highway, bridge, causeway or tunnel where
such vehicle constitutes an obstruction to
traffic (U.C.A. 41-6-102[b ]) •

c.

When an /.officer has indications that the
vehicle 'had been stolen or taken without the
owner's consent (U.C.A. 41-6-102[c][I] and
41-1-115).

d.

When a vehicle on a roadway is so disabled as
to be a hazard to traffic and the person or
persons in charge of such vehicle are unable to
provide for its custody or removal (U.C.A.
41-6-102[2]).

e.

When the person driving or in control of such
vehicle is arrested for an alleged offense for
which the officer is required by law to take a
person immediately before a magistrate (U.C.A.
41-6-102[c][3]).

£•

When the vehicle is being operated with
improper registration (U.C.A. 41-1-115).

General Order No, 83-10
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g.

When any manufacturer's mark or identification
mark has been altered, defaced or obliterated
(U.C.A. 41-1-115).

h.

When a vehicle Is found being driven on~a
highway in unsafe mechanical condition (U.C.A.
41-6-157).

i.

When a vehicle has been left unattended on a
highway for more than 24 hours, it is then
presumed to be abandoned (U.C.A. 41-6-116[10]).

j.

When a vehicle has been left unattended on
other public or private property for more than
seven days, it is then presumed to be abandoned
(U.C.A. 41-6-116[10]).

k.

When removal is necessary in the interest of
public safety because of fire, flood, storm,
snow or other emergency reasons or for the
safety of the vehicle and its contents.

DEFINITIONS
1.

Towed away: When a wrecker service removes the
vehicle for the purpose of storage or safekeeping.

2.

Impound: When a vehicle is being held for legal
reasons and the owner must fulfill certain legal
requirements before he regains possession.

3.

Hold-for-owneY: When a vehicle has been removed at
the direction of an officer and the owner may regain
possession at his discretion by assuming obligations
incurred for towing and storage.

4.

Seized: When an officer takes custody of a vehicle
which has been used in transporting any contraband
items and legal ownership could be transferred to
the State of Utah by appropriate legal action.

5.

HoId-for-evidence: When an officer takes custody of
a venicle ana such vehicle is needed as evidence in
any pending criminal action.

PROCEDURE
1.

When a vehicle is taken to any police parking lot,
impound lot or to any commercial storage lot, a

General Order No. 83-10
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written inventory shall be .made of the contents of
the vehicle. Such record >shall#1become a part of the
case file. When custody ofjthe'^yehicle changes from
.one person to another, the .person-.taking custody of
the vehicle shall also assume"xustody^of the
contents by placing his signature-on-the inventory
list.
When a vehicle is removed on a hold-for-owner basis,
immediate steps shall be taken to locate- the owner
and inform him of the location of the vehicle and
how he may regain possession. If the owner cannot
be located within 24 hours, the vehicle shall be
impounded.
When a vehicle is impounded for Driving Under the
Influence, improper registration, stoLen or
abandoned, the officer shall immediately complete a
Utah State Tax Commission impound report, place the
Commission copy in the appropriate envelope and mail
to the State Tax Commission. After the impound
report has been mailed, the officer shall not '*
authorize the release of the vehicle without the
express consent of the State Tax Commission.
When an officer takes custody'of a vehicle for
ho:ld-for-evidence, the officer shall cause a notice
to* be placed on the vehicle stating that the vehicle
is being held as evidence and also inform the
storage lot attendant of this fact. He shall
immediately inform the prosecuting attorney. Such
vehicle shall be released only on approval of the
prosecuting attorney or at the direction of the
court.
When a vehicle has been seized, the officer shall
proceed as set forth in 4 above and then proceed in
accordance with current procedure and law.
An entry shall be made in the officer's daily log
recording information as to location and disposition
of all such vehicles and a separate entry with the
same information shall become part of the case file.
Costs of towing and storage of vehicles shall be the
responsibility of the owner except for hold-forevidence and seized vehicles. In such cases
financial arrangements for storage charges should be
made through the prosecuting attorney.

General Order No, 83-10
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All vehicle keys shall remain with the vehicle and
shall^be'surrendered to the owner or driver at the
time"the_vehicle is released.
METHODS-TO-BE USED
1.

Physically arrested persons
a.

In the event the driver or person in control of
a vehicle is arrested and taken from the scene,
the vehicle shall be under the control of the
arresting officer and handled in the following
manner:
1)

If permission is obtained from the owner
or driver and if other manpower is readily
available, the. vehicle may be driven to
the impound lot, police parking lot or the
owner's residence, whichever is the most
practical, keeping in mind the safety of
the vehicle and its contents; or

2)

The officer may have the vehicle towed
away'on a hold-for-owner basis. The
towing service will then assume
responsibility for the vehicle; or

3)

The vehicle may be released to a
responsible person designated by the
arrestee after proper identification of
persons and vehicle has been established,

4)

When the driver of a vehicle is arrested
for driving under the influence the
officer shall comply with the provisions
of 41-6-44.30 which*says:
"(1) If a category I Peace Officer
arrests or cites the driver of a
vehicle for violating 41-6-44 or
41-6-44.10,...The officer shall seize
and impound the vehicle except as
provided under subsection (2).
(2) If a registered owner of the
vehicle, othr than the driver, is
present at the time of the arrest,
the officer may release the vehicle

General Order No, 83-10
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.to that registered owner, but only if
the registered owner:
A) Requests "to remove the vehicle
from the scene;
B) Presents to the officer a valid
driver license and sufficient
identification to prove ownership of
vehicle;
C) Complies with all reestrictions of
his driver license, and
D) Would not, in the judgment of the
officer, be in violation of Section
41-6-44 or 41-6-44.10..., if
permitted to operate the vehicle and
if the vehicle itself is legally
operable. "
Stolen vehicle
a.

Determine if the vehicle is to be held for
evidence by contacting the police agency
reporting the vehicle stolen. If practical,
act according to the request of the reporting
agency in determining disposition.

b.

If the vehicle is not to be held and where
reasonable and practical, request the owner
come to^the scene and claim the vehicle. If
.the owner is not able to respond immediately,
the vehicle shall be towed away.

c.

If the vehicle is towed away or otherwise
retained in custody by the officer, it shall
immediately be impounded.

Vehicles parked on highway
a.

Vehicles in traffic lane
1)

Have the person in
remove the vehi-cle
safety. If unable
may be immediately

charge immediately
to the nearest place of
to do so, the vehicle
towed away.

General Order No. 83-10
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2)
b.

Take appropriate enforcement action.

Vehicles on or adjacent to shoulder
1)

When an officer finds any vehicle parked
on or adjacent to the shoulder of any
interstate highway or any other highway
which has a posted speed of 55 m.p.h., he
shall take immediate steps to determine
why the vehicle was parked at that
location and the approximate time of its
intended removal. If in the opinion of
the officer the position of the vehicle
does not constitute an obstruction of the
normal movement of traffic, the vehicle
may be left for a reasonable length of
time not to exceed two hours. If in his
opinion it does* constitute an obstruction
to traffic, snow removal or highway
maintenance, he may immediately have the
vehicle towed away.

Z)

4.

Any vehicle not in violation of subsection
1) above left unattended for a period in
excess of 24 hours shall be presumed to
haye been abandoned. If, after reasonable
attempts to have the owner remove the
vehicle, the owner cannot or does not
respond, the vehicle should be impounded.
Vehicles parked on private property
a.

No officer shall remove or cause to be removed
any vehicle parked on private property unless
such vehicle has been found to have been
stolen, abandoned or to be used for evidentiary
purposes. A vehicle is presumed to be abandoned if left unattended on private property
without the express or implied consent of the
owner for a period in excess of seven days.
In the event a vehicle is abandoned on private
property, an officer should impound the vehicle
only after having secured a signed request from
the owner or person in lawful control of such
property on Utah Highway Patrol Form HPF-5,
"Request to Remove Vehicle from Private
Property." Such request shall become part of
the case file.

General Order No. 83-10
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Vehicles on highway with improper registration
a.

b.

Vehicle being operated with expired
registration,
1)

Issue a uniform complaint and summons,

2)

Instruct the driver to remove the .vehicle
from *the highway until the proper
registration is obtained.

Vehicle being operated with no registration or
with registration issued for another person or
vehicle.
1)

Issue a uniform complaint and summons.

2)

If in the officers opinion the violation
is flagrant, the vehicle should be
impounded; if it is not impounded, follow
a.2) above.

3)

c.

If impounded, all improper plates and
certificate of registration -shall be
removed and sent to the State Tax
Commission with the impound notice.
Vehicles parked with expired or no registration
displayed.
1)

After reasonable efforts have been made to
haye owner remove the vehicle, handle in
the same manner as abandoned vehicles.

Vehicles being operated in unsafe mechanical
condition.
a.

Take appropriate enforcement action.

b.

If in the opinion of the officer the equipment
condition is serious, the officer may issue a
defective equipment notice in addition to any
citation. Inform the operator that the vehicle
may not be operated again until such defect has
been corrected (U.C.A. 41-6-157 [b][c]).

c»

When in the opinion of the officer continued
operation would be unreasonable and excessively
dangerous, the officer may require the owner or

General Order No, 83-10
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operator to remove the vehicle by means other
than being driven. If the vehicle is towed
away, it may be taken to any location as
directed by the owner or operator (U.C.A.
41-6-157 [c]).
REVIEW
This order shall be reviewed before July 1, 1989.
Effective date November 15, 1984.
Colonel Dennis J. Nordfelt
Superintendent
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